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Abstract 
Using a new narrative dataset on fiscal consolidation announcements for thirteen EU countries over 
the period 1978-2013, a panel VAR analysis shows that revenue-based announcements appear more 
credible, but affect economic activity more adversely than do spending-based announcements. Higher 
revenue multipliers and, to a lesser extent, larger actual follow-up following a revenue-based 
announcement help to explain the difference. The uniqueness of our dataset allows to control for 
anticipation effects of budgetary implementation and variables that respond quickly to news. The 
main findings are similar if we include in the specification open-economy variables.  
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What are the macroeconomic effects of fiscal consolidation plans? How do they differ between 
revenue-based and spending-based consolidations and, if they differ, then why? In recent years a 
number of papers (Guajardo et al., 2014, and Alesina et al., 2015a and 2015b) have tried to address 
these questions starting from the annual narrative dataset constructed by Devries et al. (2011). A 
robust result in the literature based on this dataset is that revenue-based consolidations are more 
harmful for output than expenditure-based consolidations. Different explanations have been offered 
for this finding. Guajardo et al. (2014) suggest that spending-based consolidations tend to be 
accompanied by monetary policy accommodation. They may also be accompanied by other 
accommodating policies such as labor and goods market liberalization. Alesina et al. (2015a,b) show 
that spending-based consolidations boost business confidence and private investment. Relatedly, it 
has been argued that, because they are politically more costly, spending-based consolidations provide 
a stronger signal to the private sector that the government intends to improve its budgetary situation 
(Ardagna, 2004).6 Expanding the narrative dataset of Devries et al. (2011), Alesina et al. (2017) confirm 
the heterogeneous effects of spending- versus revenue-based consolidation plans, while controlling 
for monetary policy. They offer an alternative explanation for this heterogeneity in the context of a 
standard New-Keynesian model by demonstrating that the relatively more favorable output effect of 
spending-based consolidation increases with the degree of persistence of the fiscal measures. 
Measures taking in the context of spending-based consolidations tend to be highly persistent. 
Using a unique dataset identifying the precise moment of consolidation announcements, this paper 
explores differences in macroeconomic responses following announcements of revenue-based versus 
spending-based consolidations in the European Union (EU). Our dataset is quarterly instead of annual, 
as is common in the literature. Hence, we can control for anticipation effects of budgetary 
implementation and variables that respond quickly to news, such as asset prices and confidence 
indicators, allowing for proper inference if these effects do indeed play a role. We find that economic 
activity reacts in a markedly more negative way to a revenue-based than a spending-based 
announcement, and we show that higher revenue multipliers and, to a lesser extent, larger follow-up 
in actual consolidation under the former help to explain the difference. These findings are 
complementary to the existing literature. 
Differences in follow-up may arise for different reasons. For political reasons governments may find it 
more difficult to stick to promises to reduce spending, because the benefits of spending are usually 
 
6 The argument is related to Cukierman and Tommasi (1988) who argue that political decisions that are at odds 
with the preferences of the natural constituency of a party are most credible. 
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more concentrated among certain groups in the population, who therefore have a greater interest in 
fighting plans to reduce the spending they benefit from, while tax increases can be more thinly spread 
over the population and the net benefit of resistance is likely smaller.7,8 Also overoptimistic GDP 
projections associated with consolidation announcements may increase the gap in follow-up. If GDP 
growth falls short of its projection, both nominal revenues (numerator) and nominal GDP 
(denominator) fall relative to their projections, leaving their ratio roughly in line with its projection. 
By contrast, a slightly negative spending elasticity reinforces the denominator effect and, hence, a 
projected spending reduction will be partially offset. 
Because our dataset makes it possible to capture the short-term response of the exchange rate (a 
jump variable) following a consolidation announcement, it is particularly suited also to analyze an 
open-economy specification of our model. We find that our main results are similar for both a closed-
economy specification and one extended with open-economy variables, such as exports, imports and 
the exchange rate. The open-economy variables respond in line with standard mechanisms. Following 
a consolidation announcement, the real effective exchange rate depreciates and the trade balance 
improves. This improvement results largely from falling imports in the case of a revenues-based 
announcement and from rising exports following a spending-based announcement. Distinguishing 
floating and fixed exchange rate regimes, we observe some differences. GDP and private consumption 
respond in a rather similar way following a revenue-based announcement. Following a spending-
based announcement, they stay flat under a fixed regime, but fall under a float. Our estimates suggest 
that larger follow-up in terms of improving the public balance under a float helps to explain the 
difference. 
Our analysis proceeds in a number of steps. First, we provide evidence of differences in follow-up of 
revenue- versus spending-based consolidation plans by directly comparing ex-post actual fiscal data 
from the OECD with the annual narratively-identified consolidation plans of Devries et al. (2011) and 
Alesina et al. (2015a,b). We do this by very carefully matching the narrative measures with the 
appropriate variables for the ex-post outcomes. We find a systematic shortfall of the latter relative to 
the narrative measures for spending-based measures. The average shortfall is substantially smaller for 
revenue-based measures. This finding motivates our ensuing deeper empirical analysis into the 
differential effects of spending-based versus revenue-based consolidation plans. To this end, we 
 
7 The mechanism is analogous to that underlying Von Hagen and Harden’s (1995) model in which spending 
ministers enjoy the benefit of a greater allocation of resources to their own ministry, while the cost in terms of 
higher taxes is borne by everyone. With a weak finance minister, this may easily lead to sub-optimally high 
spending from a social-planner perspective.  
8 Indirect evidence on general strikes reported in Appendix C.2 suggest that these are more likely to be triggered 
by plans to cut spending than plans to raise taxes.  
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construct our narrative dataset of fiscal consolidation announcements for thirteen EU countries over 
the period 1978-2013. The dataset is based on assigning consolidation information as accurately as 
possible to the month in which it first becomes publicly available. 
We then enter the consolidation announcements as shocks into a quarterly (Bayesian) panel vector 
auto-regression (VAR). By using properly-timed announcements we can thus account for potential 
private sector anticipatory behavior and movements in “jump” variables that may take place between 
the moment the plan becomes public information and its actual implementation. Our Bayesian 
estimation approach is particularly suited for handling the larger-scale panel VARs that we deploy. 
Our panel VAR shows that announcements of revenue-based versus spending-based consolidations 
produce very different economic responses. Following a revenue-based announcement, GDP, 
consumption and consumer confidence decline significantly, while the long-term interest rate rises 
significantly. By contrast, after a spending-based consolidation announcement none of these variables 
exhibit a material reaction. We also observe that revenue-based consolidation announcements lead 
on average to a larger follow-up in terms of actual revenues than do spending-based consolidation 
announcements in terms of actual spending. These findings are robust to a large number of alterations 
to the baseline specification. 
We then investigate the sources of the differences in economic activity following the two 
announcement types. We decompose cumulative output responses into cumulative multipliers to the 
fiscal instrument and follow-up of the instrument to the consolidation announcement.  We find that 
a larger cumulative multiplier for given implementation of revenue measures and, to a lesser extent, 
a larger degree of implementation of revenue measures following a revenue-based announcement 
contribute to explaining the difference in the cumulative output responses. For example, normalizing 
the follow-up in both cases to 1 percent of GDP, two years after a consolidation announcement GDP 
is between 1.5 and 2 percent lower after a revenue-based than after a spending-based announcement. 
Follow-up is about 1 percentage point of GDP higher both in terms of primary balance and in terms of 
the own instrument after a revenue-based announcement. It is important to realize that, while due to 
stronger negative multiplier effects economic activity falls more following a revenue-based 
consolidation announcement, this does not necessarily imply that spending-based consolidations are 
preferred to revenue-based consolidations. In fact, if the public budget is on a clearly unsustainable 
trajectory, announcing a revenue-based consolidation with a higher expected degree of 
implementation may be preferable. 
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Our next step is to extend our closed-economy specification to an open-economy specification. The 
usefulness of this two-step structure is that it allows us to explore explicitly the role of open-economy 
variables in driving the differences in the responses to the two types of consolidation announcements. 
However, we find that the differences in these responses are preserved in the open-economy 
framework, although in the case of spending-based announcements the average responses hide some 
differences between floating and fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the predictions of standard 
theoretical frameworks of the effects of revenue- and spending-based consolidations on the economy. 
It also links this paper to other relevant strands in the literature. As a stepping stone for the ensuing 
analysis, Section 3 investigates the realization of annual fiscal consolidation plans identified in existing 
datasets by directly comparing these plans with ex-post data on revenues and spending. Section 4 
describes our dataset of fiscal consolidation announcements. Section 5 contains the panel VAR 
analysis to explore the roles of differences in follow-up and in fiscal multipliers for the asymmetric 
economic performance following the two types of plan announcements. Section 6 extends the analysis 
to include open-economy variables. Finally, Section 7 concludes the main text. The Appendices and a 
separate Data Construction Appendix are available from the journal’s website. 
 
2. Conceptual theoretical framework and related literature 
2.1 Conceptual theoretical framework 
The Great Recession has motivated a large amount of work estimating the sign and magnitude of fiscal 
multipliers. Empirical evidence generally shows that positive revenue shocks are contractionary 
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Romer and Romer, 2010; Barro and Redlick, 2011), with output 
multipliers ranging between -0.5 and -5.9 Reductions in public wage expenditures lower disposable 
income directly, while reductions in non-wage public spending on goods and services lower disposable 
income by depressing the demand for private sector output and, hence, income generated in the 
private sector. These results are confirmed for narratively-identified consolidation measures: for a 
panel of OECD countries Guajardo et al. (2014) find that both the revenues and spending measures 
are associated with reductions in consumption and GDP. However, there is evidence (e.g. Guajardo et 
 
9 Since the turn of the century a substantial amount of effort has been devoted to estimating fiscal multipliers. 
Examples of other contributions are Beetsma et al. (2008), Bénétrix and Lane (2009), Beetsma and Giuliodori 
(2011), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Corsetti et al. (2012) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013). 
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al., 2014, and Alesina et al., 2015a and 2015b) that spending-based consolidations are less harmful in 
terms of economic activity than are revenue-based consolidations. 
While we do not present a formal model, this subsection offers a conceptual discussion of the 
differential consequences of revenue- versus spending-based consolidation plans. We start with a 
closed-economy setting, followed by a discussion of an open-economy framework.  
2.1.1. A closed-economy setting 
It is impossible to do justice here to all contributions analyzing fiscal consolidations. That said, the 
literature that explicitly compares the theoretical implications of revenue- versus spending-based 
consolidations is rather limited. 
In a standard Keynesian closed-economy setting with individuals consuming their disposable income, 
the government purchases multiplier exceeds the tax multiplier. This framework ignores that at least 
a substantial fraction of individuals is forward-looking and makes intertemporal trade-offs. In a simple 
intertemporal neoclassical setting, the negative output effects of revenue-based consolidation may 
be worse than those of a spending-based consolidation. Suppose that, given revenues, spending is 
growing in an unsustainable way, while losses from tax distortions increase in a non-linear way, then 
a spending-based consolidation would restore sustainability right away, while a revenue-based 
consolidation might require further tax increases in the future with the associated larger losses from 
distortions. Anticipating this course of events, consumption and output would react more favorably 
to a spending-based than to a revenue-based consolidation (see Alesina et al., 2019a). 
In Baxter and King (1993) a permanent increase in non-productive government purchases financed by 
lump-sum taxes produces a static negative effect on consumption, but, because leisure falls, output 
rises. An additional dynamic effect is generated in the case of spending on public investment due to 
the rise in the marginal productivity of capital. Output multipliers of spending can exceed one both in 
the short- and the long-run when the capital-labor and wage-rental ratio have returned to their 
original levels. Compared to lump-sum tax financing, financing of spending with a distortionary output 
tax lowers labor supply (in the presence of pre-existing transfers) and investment, thereby also 
reducing output, which in turn requires a further tax increase. Hence, multipliers depend on the 
composition of the changes in revenues and spending.10 
 
10 The effects of taxes may also depend on their initial level, because of increasing distortions and disincentive 
effects at higher levels of taxation. For example, Gunter et al. (2019) find more negative tax multipliers for EU 
countries than for lower-income countries, which may be explained by the higher initial tax rate in the former 
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While a spending increase raises output in a New-Keynesian setting, price stickiness alone may not be 
enough for a positive effect on private consumption. However, with a sufficient fraction of rule-of-
thumb consumers both output and private consumption rise, as Gali et al. (2007) demonstrate. They 
also show that the spending multiplier falls with persistence of the spending shock. Such persistence 
is a crucial determinant of the relative effects of spending- versus revenue shocks in the new-
Keynesian model of Alesina et al. (2017). They point out that spending reductions in the consolidation 
plans they (and we) study are usually permanent. A government spending cut causes a negative 
demand effect. With sticky prices, output and employment fall. The more persistent is the cut, the 
lower will be future taxes, implying a larger positive wealth effect on private consumption and, hence, 
the reduction contraction of output and employment will be smaller. Higher taxes cause larger labor 
distortions, leading firms to cut back on labor, hence falling output. 
Other channels may play a role as well. An austerity plan that effectively stabilizes the debt may boost 
investors' confidence, leading to a surge in private investment (Alesina et al., 2019b). Spending-based 
plans are more likely to stabilize the public debt, because increases in taxes do not stop the growth of 
spending. Moreover, if entrepreneurs and investors expect taxes to go up in the future, they will invest 
less today, as they expect profits to be more heavily taxed in the future and heavier taxes on 
consumers depress future sales.  
2.1.2. Open economy extensions 
Extending the standard Keynesian setting to an open economy with perfect capital mobility and fully 
flexible exchange rates, a fiscal contraction of either type, via spending or revenues, is offset by an 
exchange depreciation, leaving output unaffected. With a fixed exchange rate the negative effect from 
a public spending decrease exceeds that of a revenue increase, because the marginal propensity to 
consume is less than one. However, switching to a New-Keynesian setting, Alesina et al. (2017) 
demonstrate with simulations that an extension of their New-Keynesian model to an open-economy 
setting with goods trade and an incomplete international asset market does not alter the conclusion 
that a spending-based consolidation has a less detrimental effect on economic activity than a revenue-
based consolidation. This is the case for both flexible and fixed exchange rates. The result is robust in 
spite of the potentially different real exchange rate responses, which may depend on the exchange 
rate regime, the dynamics of international real interest rates differentials and the monetary policy 
rule. Estimates by Bénétrix and Lane (2013) suggest that the real exchange rate response to 
 
group. In our empirical analysis, we constrain tax multipliers to be constant, which seems a reasonable 
approximation for our group of reasonably comparable countries.  
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government spending shocks depends on the exchange rate regime, with a reduction in spending 
giving rise to a real depreciation for EMU countries and a real appreciation for a group of major 
floaters. The latter findings are also confirmed by Ravn et al. (2012). 
2.2 Other related literature 
This paper relates to several other strands of the literature. A first strand consists of empirical studies 
that document sizable and systematic deviations of actual implementation from fiscal plans. Examples 
are Jonung and Larch (2006), Beetsma et al. (2009), Von Hagen (2010), Pina and Neves (2011), 
Cimadomo (2012), Beetsma et al. (2013), De Castro et al. (2013) and Debrun and Kinda (2017).11 Using 
data from the EU’s Stability and Convergence Programs, Beetsma et al. (2009) show that actual 
budgetary adjustment falls systematically short of planned adjustment, and that the shortfall 
increases with the projection horizon. Pina and Neves (2011) employ EU Excessive Deficit Procedure 
reporting data to conclude that budget balance forecasting errors are responsive to fiscal institutions 
and opportunistic political motivations. A related conclusion is reached by Beetsma et al. (2013), who 
find that institutional quality – as measured by the tightness of national fiscal rules, the medium-term 
budgetary framework or budgetary transparency – improves budgetary forecasting in the EU. De 
Castro et al. (2013) find that preliminary deficit data are gradually adjusted, such that later data 
vintages report a larger deficit for a given year. Countries try to systematically exploit the margins of 
acceptable reporting, but are subsequently corrected by Eurostat. Frankel and Schreger (2013) report 
particularly strong over-optimism when the deficit exceeds the 3% of GDP limit at the moment that 
the forecast is constructed. For a broad panel of narratively-identified consolidation episodes across 
countries, Gupta et al. (2017) show that promise gaps are on average sizable. Both economic and 
political factors contribute to the gaps. 
A second strand is the growing body of work that explores the role of news for short-term economic 
dynamics. New information about future (economic) developments affects the expectations of private 
sector agents, who adjust their behavior in anticipation of the future state of the economy (Beaudry 
and Portier, 2014). Expectations of fiscal consolidations may either moderate or exacerbate the 
contractionary effect of the actual measures on the real economy. Under the “expansionary austerity" 
view, if private agents realize that consolidation will prevent a future increase in taxation, fiscal 
adjustment now will boost optimism about the economy and thus act as a stimulating economic force 
(Blanchard, 1990, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, and Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). By contrast, Akerlof 
and Shiller (2009) posit the existence of a “confidence multiplier”, which may amplify the Keynesian 
 
11 Cimadomo (2012) shows that OECD countries often plan a counter-cyclical fiscal stance, while fiscal outcomes 
tend to point towards a-cyclicality or pro-cyclicality. 
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effects of fiscal policy. Indeed, Bachmann and Sims (2012) find that during recessions in the United 
States the “confidence multiplier” reinforces the Keynesian effects of higher government spending. 
Further, Ramey (2011) and Mertens and Ravn (2010, 2012) show that anticipation effects can play an 
important role in the identification of structural fiscal shocks and that incorporating narrative shocks 
produces empirical results different from those based on standard techniques. Our dataset of fiscal 
consolidation announcements is particularly suited to addressing anticipation effects. From a 
methodological viewpoint, our work uses explicitly-identified shocks (as, for instance, in Brückner and 
Pappa, 2015) to explore the link between news and short-term economic dynamics. Hence,  it belongs 
to the literature deploying narratively-identified fiscal VAR models, using consolidation 
announcements as shocks. 
Finally, our paper relates to recent work on the relationship between fiscal consolidations and 
sovereign yields. De Jong (2018) finds evidence that new information hinting at an improvement of 
the Dutch public budget reduces sovereign spreads against Germany. For a panel based on a broad 
sample of advanced and emerging economies, Born et al. (2019) find that the effect of a cut in 
government consumption on the sovereign spread against a “riskless” reference country typically 
depends on the state of the economy. Similarly, for a panel of emerging economies experiencing high 
sovereign spreads or under an IMF program, David et al. (2019) report a significant drop in those 
spreads after news about the approval of austerity measures by the legislature.  
 
3. Ex-post deviations from real-time fiscal consolidation measures 
As a stepping stone to our ensuing analysis, this section explores the extent to which ex-post annual 
fiscal changes correspond to the annual fiscal consolidation measures narratively-identified by Devries 
et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2015a,b) in their expansion of the dataset of Devries et al. (2011). The 
dataset of Alesina et al. covers thirteen EU countries. For Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom the sample spans the period 1978 – 
2013, whereas for Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands it covers the period 1978 – 2008. Evidence of 
a systematic difference in the follow-up of the narratively-identified revenue and spending measures 
helps us to motivate the econometric analysis in Section 5, which will be based on our new dataset of 
fiscal consolidation announcements to be described in Section 4, and in which we investigate the 
sources of the differences in economic responses following revenue- and spending-based 




3.1. Matching of ex-post data with the narrative consolidation data 
The annual fiscal consolidation measures in the dataset of Devries et al. (2011) are narratively selected 
from policy documents such that their primary motivation is sustainability of the public budget and 
not a response to the business cycle. The identified measures together with their estimated budgetary 
impact reflect the “intentions and actions” of policymakers as described in a wide range of 
contemporaneous policy documents.12 Alesina et al. (2015a,b) distinguish between anticipated and 
unanticipated implementations and, in extending the dataset for the period 2009-2013, they follow 
the same approach as Devries et al. (2011). An important source of information used in particular by 
Alesina et al. (2015a,b) are the Stability and Convergence Programs submitted by EU member states. 
These documents contain both forecasts of the effects of fiscal plans for the coming years and real-
time estimates of the impact of the measures taken in the current and preceding years. Therefore, in 
both the narrative dataset of Devries et al. (2011) and in its extension, the intended magnitude of a 
fiscal consolidation represents a mixture of forecasts and first-release data. 
We compare changes in actual (i.e., ex-post) public revenues and spending with the estimated 
budgetary impact of the narratively-identified consolidation measures by Devries et al. (2011) and 
Alesina et al. (2015a,b) for each year. The comparison is served best by matching as well as possible 
the concepts of revenues and spending used in the narrative identification with ex-post actual 
revenues and spending. Because there is no obvious one-to-one correspondence between the 
revenue and spending consolidation plans and the respective ex-post measures, we will compare the 
narratively-identified consolidation measures with various alternative (e.g. from the most 
comprehensive to more narrow definitions) ex-post budgetary measures. Appendix A contains a full 
description of the annual data used in this section.  
3.2. A simple accounting framework 
We employ a simple accounting framework for the comparison between ex-post and planned fiscal 
changes. The starting point is the following expression: 
 
− − − , for 𝑋 = 𝑇, 𝐺,                                                                               (1) 
 
12 The recorded budgetary impact is the estimated change in budgetary savings accounted for by all the 
measures implemented in a given year. The sources include Stability and Convergence Programs submitted by 
the governments to the European Commission, OECD Economic Surveys, IMF Staff Reports, IMF Recent 
Economic Development reports, official budget documents, etcetera. 
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where 𝑇 is nominal government revenues and 𝐺 is nominal government spending. Here, −  
is the change in component 𝑋 as a share of nominal GDP calculated ex-post using the final data vintage 
of the OECD Economic Outlook, while −  is the amount of consolidation in component 𝑋 as 
a share of nominal GDP announced in year ℎ ≤ 𝑡 − 1, which is obtained from the narrative 
consolidation dataset. Because consolidations concern discretionary measures to revenues and 
spending, we also calculate the ex-post deviations of the cyclically-adjusted part of component 𝑋:  
 
− − − , for 𝑋 = 𝑇, 𝐺,                                                               (2)  
where superscript “CA” indicates the cyclically-adjusted component, which we obtain directly from 
the OECD Economic Outlook. The problems with cyclically-adjusting fiscal variables are well-known. 
However, these provide the conceptually more appropriate variants to evaluate in terms of follow-up. 
Moreover, the results will be very similar to those for the non-adjusted variants. 
3.3. Results of the comparison 
Table 1 reports the ex-post deviations of actual revenues from planned increases averaged per country 
over the consolidation years identified by Devries et al. (2011) and Alesina et al. (2015a,b) and 
averaged over all consolidation episodes in our EU dataset. Similarly, Table 2 reports the ex-post 
deviations of actual expenditures from planned reductions. As pointed out above, there is no unique 
one-to-one correspondence between the actual revenue and spending measures constructed from 
the OECD dataset and the composition of the consolidation plans identified by Devries et al. (2011) 
and Alesina et al. (2015a,b). However, the conclusions of the comparison of the shortfalls for revenues 
and spending are the same regardless of the alternative budgetary aggregates we use. For the most 
comprehensive measure of revenues, “Total receipts, excluding gross interest receipts” (which should 
cover all the items contained in the consolidation plans), we observe that the average shortfall over 
all consolidations is 0.15% of GDP. For the other revenues measures, i.e. “Current receipts, excluding 
gross interest receipts”, its cyclically-adjusted version, and “Total revenues, narrow definition”, the 
average shortfalls are slightly larger (up to a maximum of roughly 0.18% of GDP). 
The finding that the average shortfall is similar in all variants may be remarkable at first sight, as 
revenue bases are highly pro-cyclical. However, two factors reduce the role of this effect in calculating 
the average shortfall. First, the two terms in brackets in (1) are based on changes. Because of the 
persistence in the business cycle, the cyclical part in the two components of the first term in brackets 
in (1) is persistent. Hence, taking the difference between these components brings this first term close 
12 
 
to the first term in brackets in (2). Second, we compute the average shortfall over all business cycle 
situations, which reduces the impact of cyclical fluctuations further. Recall that Devries et al. (2011) 
and Alesina et al. (2015a,b) identify consolidation measures not motivated by the business cycle 
situation. 
The average shortfalls of spending are substantially larger than those of revenues. For the most 
comprehensive measure, “Total disbursements, excluding gross interest payments”, the average 
figure is 0.50% of GDP. For the other measures, i.e. “Current disbursements, excluding gross interest 
payments”, its cyclically-adjusted version,13 and “Total expenditure, narrow definition”, the average 
deviations are even larger. While the average size of planned spending measures in a consolidation 
(0.85% of GDP) exceeds the average size of planned revenues measures in a consolidation (0.51% of 
GDP), we find that the average shortfalls from planned spending reductions are proportionally larger 
than the average shortfalls from planned revenues measures. Based on the average shortfall of 
revenue measures, we would have expected an average shortfall of spending measures of 
(0.15/0.51)*0.85 = 0.25% of GDP, half of the actual figure of 0.50% of GDP.14 
Looking at the individual countries, where we average over the consolidation years, we observe that 
for the most comprehensive revenues measure, only 5 out of 13 countries exhibit a shortfall. This 
contrasts with the most comprehensive spending measure, for which we find that 10 out of 13 
countries exhibit a shortfall. For the other revenue and spending measures we register higher fractions 
of shortfalls, but the spending measure is always characterized by weaker follow-up than the 
corresponding revenue measure. 
Table 1: Average of ex-post deviations for revenues in percent of GDP 
 D_TREV D_CREV D_CACREV D_NREV 
Austria 0.251 (9) 0.045 (6) -0.001 (6) 0.293 (9) 
Belgium 0.007 (13) -0.044 (13) 0.025 (10) -0.027 (13) 
Denmark 0.456 (8) 0.492 (8) -0.105 (4) 0.575 (8) 
Finland 0.126 (3) 0.133 (3) -0.331 (3) 0.180 (3) 
France 0.123 (11) 0.089 (11) -0.022 (10) 0.090 (11) 
Germany 0.058 (13) 0.042 (13) -0.000 (13) 0.046 (13) 
Ireland -1.818 (5) -1.648 (5) -1.552 (5) -1.786 (5) 
Italy -0.446 (16) -0.365 (16) -0.372 (16) -0.435 (16) 
Netherlands 0.207 (9) 0.204 (9) 0.214 (7) 0.211 (9) 
Portugal -0.069 (10) -0.103 (10) -0.113 (9) -0.280 (10) 
Spain -0.253 (12) -0.251 (12) -0.174 (10) -0.366 (12) 
 
13 The cyclical component of spending is limited compared to that of revenues. However, there is still some 
cyclicality, mostly linked to unemployment benefit payments.  
14 Appendix C discusses two potentially complementary ways in which systematic lack of follow-up from 
announced consolidation plans may arise. One arises from overoptimistic growth projections. This is what we 
refer to as “passive non-follow-up”. For a given degree of over optimism about growth, passive non-follow-up is 
larger for spending- than for revenue-based announcements. The other is what we refer to as “active non-follow-
up” , which arises from governments simply not implementing announced measures. 
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Sweden -0.381 (7) -0.385 (7) -0.686 (6) -0.340 (7) 
UK 0.369 (13) 0.370 (13) 0.072 (9) 0.304 (13) 
Average -0.154 (108) -0.146 (108) -0.184 (108) -0.173 (108) 
 
Notes: (i) A negative number means a shortfall of actual implementation from the plan. (ii) Averages are 
calculated over all consolidation years per country or over all (country, consolidation year) combinations. (iii) 
D_TREV = deviations based on “Total receipts, excluding gross interest receipts”, D_CREV = deviations based on 
“Current receipts, excluding gross interest receipts”, D_CACREV = deviations based on cyclically-adjusted 
“Current receipts, excluding gross interest receipts”, and D_NREV = deviations based on “Total revenues, narrow 
definition”. (iv) The number in brackets is the number of consolidation observations per country. (v) For 
definitions and construction of variables, see Appendix A.  
 
Table 2: Average ex-post deviations for expenditures in percent of GDP 
 D_TEXP D_CEXP D_CACEXP D_NEXP 
Austria 0.348 (10) 0.495 (10) 0.086 (7) 0.426 (10) 
Belgium 0.438 (15) 0.683 (15) 0.763 (11) 0.588 (15) 
Denmark -0.048 (6) 0.228 (6) 0.307 (3) 0.202 (6) 
Finland 1.549 (6) 1.684(6) 1.621 (6) 1.715 (6) 
France 0.756 (9) 0.879 (9) 0.792 (9) 0.768 (9) 
Germany 0.204 (13) 0.138 (13) 0.277 (13) 0.147 (13) 
Ireland 0.686 (5) 1.713 (5) 0.894 (5) 1.034 (5) 
Italy 1.062 (15) 1.211 (15) 1.130 (15) 1.064 (15) 
Netherlands 0.957 (11) 1.247(11) 0.663 (6) 0.982 (11) 
Portugal 0.532 (10) 1.195 (10) 0.984 (9) 0.762 (10) 
Spain 0.889 (13) 1.390 (13) 1.034 (12) 1.118 (13) 
Sweden -0.709 (7) -0.472 (5) 0.368 (6) 0.204 (7) 
UK -0.302 (14) 0.022 (14) -0.207 (10) -0.087 (14) 
Average 0.501 (111) 0.768 (111) 0.684 (111) 0.645 (111) 
 
Notes: (i) A positive number means a shortfall of actual implementation from the plan. (ii) D_TEXP = deviations 
based on “Total disbursements, excluding gross interest payments”, D_CEXP = deviations based on “Current 
disbursements, excluding gross interest payments”, D_CACEXP = deviations based on cyclically-adjusted 
“Current disbursements, excluding gross interest payments”, and D_NEXP = deviations based on “Total 
expenditure, narrow definition”. (iii) For definitions and construction of variables, see Appendix A. (iv) Further, 
see the Notes to Table 1. 
 
4. A new dataset of fiscal consolidation announcements 
Announcements of fiscal consolidations may affect the private sector and the financial markets before 
the actual consolidation measures are executed, whether in full or only partially. For example, 
confidence indicators may respond as soon as an announcement becomes public and they may 
internalize the actual follow-up of the fiscal authorities and the responses of the macro-economy to 
an announcement. The response of confidence could potentially also act as a separate channel 
mediating the reaction of the macro-economy to an announcement. Accounting for anticipatory 
behavior requires us to identify in the best possible way the precise moment of an announcement. In 
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this section we discuss how we construct our novel dataset on announcements of fiscal austerity 
measures. 
Our dataset covers the thirteen EU countries mentioned earlier over the period 1978-2013. The 
announcements for the subsample period 1978-2008 are based on the narratively-identified 
consolidation measures documented at the annual frequency in Devries et al. (2011), while the 
announcements for the subsample period 2009-2013 are based on the consolidation measures 
narratively identified by Alesina et al. (2015a,b) for ten out of the aforementioned thirteen EU 
countries over this period. Using narrative identification from official contemporaneous government 
documents we expand their sample with Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden over the period 2009-
2013.  
We map the narratively-identified annual consolidation measures into moments of announcements. 
In some instances, Devries et al. (2011) already provide the announcement dates, and in those cases 
we use these. In the other cases we work as follows. We start from the total implementation in a given 
year and identify all the announcements behind this total – it may be the result of a number of 
measures announced at different points in time. For each measure, using official documents, we 
identify the month when it is first officially mentioned or proposed by the government. Appendix B 
provides further details and contains some examples. The online Data Construction Appendix contains 
the detailed mapping from each consolidation measure to its announcement. 
We also quantify the magnitude of the measures. We do this by extracting, cross-checking and 
combining information from a variety of official documents, such as the OECD Economic Surveys, the 
OECD (2011, 2012) reports on restoring the public finances, national budgets, EU Stability and 
Convergence Plans, as well as from newspaper articles. The documents contain information on the 
projected effects of the various measures. By grouping the measures according to the date of their 
first official mention, we record the size of the announcement on that date as the sum of the 
budgetary effects of the various individual measures announced on that date. Concretely, the 
magnitude of the announcement on a given date is the sum of the marginal impacts on the primary 
balance in percent of GDP between now and up to six years ahead of all new measures announced on 
that date. To give an example purely for the purpose of illustration, suppose two new measures are 
announced in September of year t-1. Measure 1 is expected to have a positive marginal effect of 0.5% 
of GDP on the primary balance from year t onwards, while Measure 2 is expected to have a negative 
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marginal effect on the primary balance of 0.2% of GDP from year t+1 onwards. Then, the value of the 
announcement that we record for September of year t-1 is 0.5 – 0.2 = 0.3% of GDP.15 
The resulting set of announcements constructed at the monthly frequency is aggregated to the 
quarterly frequency. The main reasons for this conversion are twofold. Firstly, macroeconomic and 
fiscal variables are (at best) only available at quarterly frequency. Secondly, we aim at mitigating  
potential anticipation effects associated with information becoming available before the official 
consolidation announcement. It may be the case that a measure receives media attention before the 
first official announcement, for example, because information from discussions at the government 
level or in ministries is leaked to the press. However, pinpointing the first moments of media attention 
to such measures is virtually unfeasible given the coverage of the data in terms of countries and 
sample period. Moreover, initial discussions in the media generally provide only little information 
about the size and the composition of the measures. By aggregating the monthly announcements to 
the quarterly frequency, we reduce the problem of potential anticipation effects associated with fiscal 
news, because fiscal news that is leaked to the media and the official release of fiscal news are more 
likely to occur in the same period. To further address the potential anticipation effects associated with 
premature media leakages, we assign any announcement made in the first month of a quarter to the 
preceding quarter.16 
It is worth mentioning that, owing to inaccuracies in the narrative data sources, the actual value 
assigned to an announcement can be a mix of ex-ante forecasts and real-time estimates of the impact 
of the measures on the primary balance.17 Hence, the assigned value to the announcement potentially 
measures the pure shock value of the consolidation plan with some error. Nevertheless, reporting a 
value has a substantial advantage over merely reporting a simple dummy for a fiscal announcement. 
Despite potential concerns about measurement errors, using values implies that less information is 
thrown away, and it allows us to exploit the possibility that announcements of larger consolidations 
 
15 Since the different components of the announcement would materialize in different years, one might 
legitimately ask whether they should not be discounted. However, given that the time space between these 
components is at a maximum a few years and in most cases less, the effect of discounting would be very small 
and, hence, we abstain from discounting. 
16 We find that our results are robust to assigning the announcement to the quarter in which it officially takes 
place. Incidentally, Ramey (2011) also carries out an adjustment in the quarterly timing of the weekly defense 
shock. If the news occurs in the final two weeks of a quarter, it is assigned to the following quarter based on the 
assumption that it occurs too late to have a material effect on macroeconomic aggregates in the quarter in which 
it originates. 
17 Most of the time, our sources (mainly the OECD Economic Surveys) provide an estimated impact of a plan at 
the moment of its announcement. However, there are instances when we do not have information about the 
estimated impact of an announced plan. In those cases, we use the impact as recorded by the EU’s Stability and 
Convergence programs or IMF or OECD documents, some of which may have been issued after the consolidation 
started, thereby potentially providing a real-time assessment of the impact of a plan. 
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elicit stronger responses than announcements of smaller consolidations. Moreover, it helps in more 
accurately classifying plans into whether they are revenue- or expenditure-based, namely not on the 
basis of the narrative description, but based on the relative estimated impact of the revenue versus 
the expenditure measures. Finally, of particular importance for this paper, it allows us to assess the 
degree of ensuing follow-up in actual measures. Summarizing, effectively our dataset extends the set 
of announcements used in Beetsma et al. (2015) with Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden for the 
additional years 2009–2013 and it assigns in most instances a value for the size of the announcement, 
instead of a simple dummy for the occurrence of the announcement as in Beetsma et al. (2015). 
Table 3 reports the magnitudes of the announced consolidation plans. Note that the figures refer to 
the average annual size of the plans, while the plans themselves are dated to the quarter in which 
their announcement takes place, as described above. In total we have 211 fiscal consolidation 
announcements. For 180 of them we are also able to establish the magnitude of their impact on the 
primary balance. The cumulative annual impact of the measures on the primary balance ranges 
between 0% and 9.3% of GDP over a maximum period of 6 years, with an average value of 1.37% of 
GDP in our country sample.18 The average spending-based content is 0.85% of GDP and the average 
revenue-based content is 0.51% of GDP. The cross-country average horizon of the consolidation plans 
ranges between 1.3 and 2.3 years. 
Most consolidation plans combine measures on both the revenue and the expenditure side of the 
budget, which is why in Table 4, following the existing literature, we classify announcements as 
“revenue-based” if more than 50% of the total announced budgetary impact comes from the revenue 
side, while, if more than 50% comes from the expenditure side, the plan is classified as “spending-
based”. The five cases in which the division between spending and revenue measures is equal will be 
dropped from the sample, whenever we study the two subsamples of spending- and revenue-based 
announcements separately. 
As Table 4 shows, the majority of the announcements in our sample are spending-based. Based on 
our data, though not reported in the tables, we find that the average spending-based plan 
announcement has a size of 1.42% of GDP, with an impact of 1.14% of GDP on the spending side and 
0.28% on the revenue side. The average revenue-based plan announcement has a value of 1.26% of 
GDP, with an impact of 0.31% of GDP on the spending side and 0.95% of GDP on the revenue side. 
 
18 The largest consolidations were announced for Ireland 2010:Q4 (9.3% of GDP), Sweden 1994:Q3 (8.4% of GDP) 
and Portugal 2011:Q3 (6.1% of GDP). Excluding these three consolidations, the average announcement has a 
value of 1.26% of GDP. For the average announcement, the cumulative impact of the revenue measures is 0.47% 
of GDP and that of the expenditure measures is 0.78% of GDP. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of fiscal announcement data 




size - all 
measures 
Average annual 
size – spending 
measures 
Average annual 






Austria 7 1.98 1.21 0.77 2.3 
Belgium 18 1.14 0.68 0.46 1.5 
Denmark 6 1.35 0.85 0.50 1.5 
Finland 10 1.47 1.37 0.10 1.6 
France 15 0.87 0.44 0.43 1.8 
Germany 16 0.92 0.56 0.36 1.7 
Ireland 15 2.05 1.10 0.95 1.3 
Italy 25 1.31 0.74 0.57 2.0 
Netherlands 22 1.17 0.99 0.18 1.3 
Portugal 10 2.09 1.19 0.90 1.8 
Spain 19 1.57 0.91 0.66 1.7 
Sweden 5 2.38 1.57 0.80 2.0 
UK 12 0.79 0.41 0.39 2.3 
Total 180 1.37 0.85 0.51 1.7 
 
 
Table 4: Announcements according to the predominance of their instruments 
 Spending-based Revenue-based Equal Total 
Austria 5 2 0 7 
Belgium 8 8 2 18 
Denmark 2 3 1 6 
Finland 8 2 0 10 
France 10 5 0 15 
Germany 10 6 0 16 
Ireland 8 6 1 15 
Italy 15 9 1 25 
Netherlands 19 3 0 22 
Portugal 5 5 0 10 
Spain 11 8 0 19 
Sweden 5 0 0 5 
UK 8 4 0 12 
Total  114 61 5 180 
 
 
5. Panel VAR analysis of role of follow-up and multipliers 
In Section 3 we have documented that follow-up is weaker for spending-based than for revenue-based 
consolidation plans. That analysis provides a stepping stone to this section, in which we, using the new 
dataset constructed in the previous section, investigate the economy’s responses to announcements 
of consolidation plans in a panel VAR, while accounting for anticipation effects. We first show that 
revenue-based consolidation announcements have more adverse consequences for the economy than 
spending-based consolidation announcements. We then disentangle the roles of differences in 




5.1. The empirical specification 
We estimate a quarterly Bayesian panel VAR model of the format:  
  𝑍 ,  = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑 + ∑ 𝐴 𝑍 , + 𝑢 , ,     (3) 
where 𝑖 indicates the country and 𝑡 the quarter, 𝑍 ,   is a vector of endogenous variables, 𝛼  is a 
country-fixed effect, 𝛽  is the coefficient of a country-specific linear time trend, 𝑑  a vector of seasonal 
dummies with coefficient vector 𝛾 and 𝑢 , ~𝑁(0, Ω) a vector of zero-mean, stationary reduced-form 
disturbances. L represents the number of lags included in the panel VAR and 𝐴   is the matrix of 
coefficients associated with the 𝑙  lag of the endogenous variables. The baseline specification focuses 
on a closed economy and features the following vector of endogenous variables: 
𝑍 ,  = [𝐹 , , 𝜏 , , 𝑔 , , 𝑦 , , 𝑐 , , 𝐿𝑇𝐼 , , 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹 , ]′. 
Here, 𝐹 ,   is the fiscal consolidation announcement in percent of GDP, 𝜏 ,  and 𝑔 ,  are nominal 
government revenues, respectively nominal government expenditures, in percent of nominal GDP, 
𝑦 ,  is the logarithm of real GDP (henceforth, “GDP”), 𝑐 ,  is the logarithm of real private consumption 
(henceforth, “consumption” or “private consumption”), 𝐿𝑇𝐼 ,   is the long-term interest rate in basis 
points and 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹 ,   is consumer confidence in percent deviation from its average.19 The impulse 
responses should be interpreted as percent deviations from the original values, except in the case of 
government revenues and expenditures, where they are in terms of percentage point of GDP 
deviations from their original values, and in the case of interest rates, where they are in terms of basis 
point deviations from their original values. Importantly, because we are assessing the follow-up of 
consolidation announcements in terms of actual measures, the definitions of revenues and 
expenditures should correspond as closely as possible to the potential sets of measures included in 
the revenues respectively expenditure components of the fiscal consolidation. This implies in 
particular that 𝑔 ,   will include transfers and is, hence, more broadly defined than merely government 
purchases. 
Empirical identification of fiscal policy shocks may be hampered by anticipation effects: the private 
sector learns about a policy change and responds to it before it is actually implemented. The legislative 
lag is the period between the official announcement of the policy measure and its legal 
implementation. Because the official announcement often coincides with the presentation of the new 
budget, we expect the legislative lag to be short on average. The implementation lag concerns the 
time between signing the relevant legislation and the moment when the new legislation comes into 
 
19 Appendix A describes the quarterly budgetary and macroeconomic variables we use in this section. 
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force. The sum of the two lags together can range from a couple of months to some years from the 
official announcement of a policy measure (Leeper et al., 2013).20 In addition, media coverage of a 
new policy measure sometimes predates its official announcement.21 If anticipated changes in 
revenues and public spending prompt economic agents to respond before the fiscal measures are 
actually implemented, the innovations identified in a structural VAR do not correspond to the true 
timing of the shocks. Formally, the moving-average representation of the VAR system is not invertible 
(Leeper et al., 2013), leading to biased estimates. 
Existing datasets based on the narrative identification of consolidation plans do not fully account for 
the combined effect of legislative and implementation lags in fiscal policy. For example, the annual 
dataset of Devries et al. (2011) assigns consolidation measures to the year when they are supposed to 
be implemented, regardless of the year when they are announced. Alesina et al. (2015a,b) distinguish 
between unanticipated and anticipated measures to improve inference. For instance, the measures 
implemented in a given year are classified as unanticipated, if they had been announced in the 
preceding fall as part of a multiannual consolidation plan. However, the authors do not identify the 
exact moment of the consolidation announcement, which is critical to account for potential 
anticipation effects. Unlike these contributions, by timing austerity plans to the moment of their 
announcement in our data set, we can take explicit account of the anticipation effects during the 
plan’s legislation and implementation phases. Hence, in contrast to Guajardo et al. (2014), for 
example, we allow macroeconomic variables to already respond to consolidation news before 
measures are actually implemented. 
De Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) and Jordà and Taylor (2016) find that the narrative shocks of Devries 
et al. (2011) can be predicted using a range of economic variables. Hence, it is conceivable that our 
fiscal consolidation announcements represent responses to past economic and financial conditions. 
We therefore identify the structural shocks by using a Cholesky decomposition of the residual 
covariance matrix:  
  Ω = 𝐴 𝐴  
where the contemporaneous impact matrix 𝐴  is lower triangular. Fiscal consolidation 
announcements are ordered first, allowing the austerity news to be predicted only by lags (of at least 
one quarter) of the economic and financial variables in the VAR. In doing so, the VAR equation 
 
20 However, in our dataset in many instances announcements coincide with the new budget for the next year, 
in which the implementation of the announced package starts.   
21 By looking at military spending, Ramey (2011) finds that news reports about wars Granger-cause increases in 
defense spending, thus providing evidence of the anticipation of government spending shocks. 
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corresponding to the fiscal consolidation announcements could be interpreted as a “policy 
announcement reaction function”, with its residuals representing the discretionary fiscal 
consolidation news.22 As demonstrated in Christiano et al. (1999), under a recursive identification the 
impulse responses of the endogenous variables in the block following the announcement shock are 
invariant to the ordering of these variables vis-à-vis each other. 
We expect anticipation effects to work not only through real variables like output and consumption, 
but also through variables that may react immediately to announcements. These include asset prices, 
like the long-term interest rate, and variables capturing private sector confidence about the future 
course of the economy. Our dataset is uniquely placed to account for the potential role of such 
variables in the transmission of consolidation announcements towards the real economy. We do not 
take a position on whether there exists a true “confidence channel” through which private sector 
confidence affects the real economy or whether variables capturing confidence merely contain news 
about the future course of the economy. Both possibilities motivate us to include the consumer 
confidence index in our set of baseline variables. It is based on whether or not surveyed individuals 
expect their personal and the general economic situation to improve or not.23 
We opt for a baseline specification containing four lags of the endogenous variables, hence amounting 
to a maximum lag length of one year. As we show below, our main results are robust to different 
choices of the lag structure and other configurations of the deterministic components. 
5.2. Baseline estimates 
Following Bańbura et.al (2012), a Normal-Inverse Wishart prior distribution is used for the VAR 
parameters with the prior hyper-parameters set to reflect a loose prior belief. The posterior 
distribution is approximated using a Gibbs sampling algorithm described in Appendix D. We conduct 
25,000 replications with the last 10,000 draws used for inference. The inefficiency factors reported in 
Appendix D provide evidence in favour of convergence. As is standard in Bayesian VAR papers, the 
figures report 68% error bands, which are approximately one standard-deviation intervals for a normal 
distribution. We estimate the panel VAR model on our sample of 13 European Union countries over 
the period 1978:Q1-2013:Q4. 
Figure 1 reports the baseline responses when all consolidation announcements are included. Here, 
and in the sequel, the shock, which takes place at time 0, is a consolidation announcement normalized 
 
22 In Section 5.3 we show that the results are robust when the consolidation announcement shock is included as 
an exogenous variable.  
23 This suggests that the consumer confidence indicator captures the role of news about the economy, rather 
than some non-fundamental driving force of the economy. 
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to 1% of GDP. To save space and because they exhibit no persistence, we do not depict the impulse 
responses of the announcements themselves. We observe a highly-significant rise in public revenues 
of more than 0.15% of GDP after a year and a peak fall in public expenditures of roughly the same 
magnitude after three quarters. GDP responds with a fall that reaches a maximum of around 0.2% 
after about two-and-a-half years. Consumption exhibits a maximum deterioration of slightly less than 
0.4% after about two years, while the long-term interest rate shows a positive jump on impact and 
peaks at 15 basis points after two quarters, after which it converges back to its steady state within 
about 4 years. Finally, consumer confidence jumps down on impact and declines by around 1.3 percent 
after half a year. Not surprisingly, because they are forward looking, the long-term interest rate and 
consumer confidence respond instantaneously to consolidation news and peak much earlier than the 
other variables.  
Next, we split the news into announcements of revenue-based and spending-based plans (Figure 2). 
These are included simultaneously in the VAR model with the revenue announcements ordered first. 
As the two announcement series are virtually uncorrelated, this ordering is innocuous (as we will show 
in our robustness analysis below). For both types of consolidation plan announcements, the shock is 
normalized to 1% of GDP. Clear differences show up. The announcement of a revenue-based plan 
produces a systematic increase in revenues reaching a maximum of about 0.6% of GDP after three 
quarters, while GDP and consumption exhibit reductions that reach maxima of around 1 and 1.5 
percent, respectively, after about two years. The combination of GDP and consumption both falling is 
consistent with a New-Keynesian setting as in Gali et al. (2007) with a sufficiently-large fraction of rule-
of-thumb consumers consuming disposable income. Public spending stays put, while the long-term 
interest rate peaks at a maximum of about 40 basis points after half a year. Consumer confidence falls 
by a maximum of almost 6 percent after half a year. Both may contribute to the fall in consumption. 
Apart from public spending itself, which declines by a maximum of 0.20 – 0.25 percentage points of 
GDP, all the other responses following a spending-based announcement remain close to zero. In 
particular, GDP and consumption remain almost perfectly flat. The long-term interest rate reaches a 
peak of slightly more than 10 basis points. The final column of Figure 2 shows that the confidence 
bands on the differences in the responses to the revenue- and spending-based plan announcements 
all deviate from zero. The difference in revenues between the plan types peaks at about 0.6 percent 
of GDP and that in expenditures at roughly 0.3 percent of GDP. 24 The difference between the GDP 
responses reaches a maximum of about one percent and that between the consumption responses of 
 
24 Notice that the higher degree of follow-up to revenue-based announcements may be partially explained by 
the slowdown of activity. This is the difference in “passive follow-up” explained in Footnote 13 and Appendix C. 
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almost 1.5 percent. Hence, consistent with, among others, Alesina et al. (2017, 2019b), economic 
activity contracts more following a revenue-based than a spending-based consolidation. However, 
subsequent follow-up in terms of actual measures also differs between the announcement types. 
Finally, the maximum difference in the responses of the long-term interest rate is almost 30 basis 
points and that of consumer confidence is around 5 percent. In the case of spending-based 
announcements consumer confidence appears to behave consistently with the subsequent trajectory 
of the economy: the lack of movement in consumer confidence is consistent with the fact that 
economic activity hardly changes in the ensuing periods. In the case of revenue-based 
announcements, the deterioration of consumer confidence is in line with the ensuing deterioration of 
economic activity. Below we will see that the increase in the long-run interest rate is most likely 
attributable to an increase in the public debt (rather than a decrease).  
5.3. Robustness of the baseline 
We investigate the robustness of our baseline estimates in various ways. For each robustness variant, 
Figure 3 depicts the differences in revenue, expenditure and GDP responses between a revenue- and 
expenditure-based consolidation announcement (i.e., each row in Figure 3 is the “transposed” 
analogue of the first three panels in the third column of Figure 2). First, it could be argued that by 
including the period since the start of the global financial crisis we capture an atypical period, during 
which the responses of economies to announcement shocks could differ from those in other periods. 
However, the differences in impulse responses when we drop the period 2008–2013 confirm the 
differences in the baseline responses for the two types of consolidation. This is also the case when the 
(relevant) nominal variables are expressed as shares of potential nominal GDP,25 and when we replace 
the revenue and spending ratios of GDP by the logarithms of real revenues and real spending, although 
here the difference in revenue responses between the two plan types is a bit larger. Restricting 
ourselves to revenue plans that contain at least 60% revenues measures and spending plans that 
contain at least 60% spending measures yields again responses that are qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar to those under the baseline. The same is the case if we include a time 
dummy for each quarter in the sample or allow for eight instead of four lags in the panel VAR. To check 
whether the baseline results are not driven by a specific country in our sample, our next robustness 
check drops one country at a time. The impulse responses are in all instances rather compactly 
clustered around the original responses, and in any case contained within the baseline confidence 
intervals, thus suggesting that no individual country drives our baseline estimates. 
 
25 Potential nominal GDP is constructed by applying to the logarithm of nominal GDP a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
and taking the exponential of the resulting trend estimate. 
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Guajardo et al. (2014) suggest that the differences in impulse responses between revenue- and 
spending-based consolidations can be explained by monetary policy being more accommodative in 
the case of spending-based consolidations. However, over a substantial part of the estimation period 
a majority of the countries in our sample had either a common currency or a stable exchange rate 
against the German mark. It is unlikely that the observed differences in the responses to revenue- and 
spending-based consolidation announcements can be explained by differences in the monetary 
responses alone, because the ECB only responds to euro-area wide macroeconomic developments 
and not to those in individual countries. Likewise, in the period before EMU, the Bundesbank only 
responded to German developments and not to those in other countries pegging their exchange rate 
to the German mark.26 Nevertheless, to control for monetary policy, we replace the long-term interest 
rate with the short-term interest rate, which is closer to the central bank’s policy instrument. 
However, again the impulse response differences are qualitatively and quantitatively essentially 
unaffected.27 
An alternative channel to that via the public debt investigated below, is that the long-term interest 
rate rises because of an increase in inflation expectations following a consolidation announcement. 
The fact that GDP falls following an announcement, especially a revenue-based announcement, 
suggests that this is not plausible. To confirm that the responses of the long-term interest rate are not 
driven by movements in inflation expectations, we redo the baseline regressions by replacing the long-
run interest rate with its difference with respect to realized CPI inflation, i.e. the ex-post long-run real 
interest rate. Figure 3 shows that our baseline results are unaffected. 
Finally, in the penultimate robustness check we order spending announcements before revenue 
announcement shocks, and in the final robustness check we include the announcement shocks as 
exogenous variables in the panel VAR. The results are very similar to those under the baseline. 
5.4. Extensions of and variations on the baseline 
In this subsection we consider extensions of the baseline. In particular, we expand the latter with the 
stock price index, the house price index and the public debt. We also explore the role of adding real 
private investment without or with replacing consumer confidence by business confidence. 
 
 
26 The open-economy specification considered in Section 6 will explicitly show the results of a split of the sample 
in fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. 
27 It seems implausible that the rise in the short-term interest rate is driven by a monetary tightening, because, 
if anything, we would expect monetary policy to become looser to avert a slowdown of the economy induced 
by a revenue-based consolidation announcement. In any case, a counterfactual in which we force the short-term 
interest rate to stay constant does not affect the impulse responses (see Figure F.8 in Appendix F). 
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5.4.1. Adding the stock price and the house price index 
 
Our first extension adds the stock price index as an additional variable to capture the confidence 
effects of a consolidation announcement. As a leading indicator, the stock price index would typically 
be a pre-cursor to changes in economic activity. Figure F.1 in Appendix F shows the responses for the 
baseline expanded with the stock price indicator. The responses of the baseline variables are 
unaffected, while the stock price indicator drops significantly upon impact in the case of a revenue-
based announcement, but it does not move after a spending-based announcement. The confidence 
band on the difference in the responses also lies below zero. In fact, the response pattern of the stock 
price is very similar to that of the consumer confidence indicator. We also estimate a variant in which, 
instead of the stock price index, we add the house price index. The responses are shown in Figure F.2 
in Appendix F. Again, the baseline responses are unaffected, while the house price index exhibits a 
pattern very similar to that of GDP: virtually no movement upon impact and a smooth fall until about 
three years after the announcement, after which the index starts a smooth ascend. The smoothness 
of the pattern may not be surprising, as house sellers are typically known to be reluctant to  lower 
prices when demand falls. 
 
5.4.2. Adding the public debt 
 
This subsection adds the public debt ratio of GDP as an endogenous variable to the baseline, in order 
to shed light on the  effectiveness of fiscal consolidation in terms of improving the health of the public 
finances. In this respect we build upon Favero and Giavazzi (2012) and Alesina et al. (2019b). Figure 4 
shows the impulse responses under the expanded model. Moreover, by including the public debt ratio 
as an endogenous variable, we also allow for a feedback of the ratio onto GDP. The potential relevance 
of such a feedback for high-debt countries was pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). We observe 
that the responses of the baseline variables are unaffected. Remarkably, contrary to what we might a 
priori expect, for both types of consolidation announcements we observe that the debt ratio increases 
following the announcement, presumably, because GDP falls (a “denominator effect”). The rise in the 
debt ratio is larger for a revenue-based than for a spending-based announcement. Alesina et al. 
(2019b) estimate an increase in the debt ratio following a revenue-based contraction and a fall after 
a spending-based contraction. Thus, we confirm the “relative ordering”, but our announcements are 
on average followed by more adverse debt ratio dynamics. The increase in the debt ratio we find likely 
explains the rise in the long-term interest rate following a consolidation announcement. This rise is 
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likely the consequence of the pricing of the risks associated with a higher public debt ratio of GDP.28 
Moreover, the larger increase in the long-term interest rate under a revenue-based consolidation 
announcement is consistent with the ensuing larger debt-servicing costs and the larger increase in the 
debt ratio after this type of announcement.  
 
5.4.3. Including real private investment 
 
We now add real private investment to the baseline. Figure F.3 in Appendix F depicts the impulse 
responses. Again, the responses of the baseline variables are unchanged. The impulse response of 
private investment is very similar to that of private consumption. 
 
An alternative to the current baseline would have been a specification with business confidence 
instead of consumer confidence. However, our sample period would become shorter for most 
countries in our sample and we would lose a number of consolidation periods. Moreover, the question 
arises which confidence indicator is more important. A priori, to the extent that confidence affects the 
real economy, we expect consumer confidence to primarily affect consumption and business 
confidence to primarily affect private investment. Because consumption is substantially larger as a 
share of GDP, consumer confidence seems to be the more relevant confidence indicator. 
Nevertheless, here we replace in the baseline the consumer confidence with the business confidence 
indicator and private consumption with private investment. Figure F.4 in Appendix F depicts the 
responses. After a revenue-based consolidation announcement, GDP again exhibits a fall, though this 
fall is smaller than under the baseline and, hence, the difference in GDP responses between the two 
types of announcement types is also smaller. Private investment also exhibits a fall under a revenue-
based consolidation announcement (consistent with Alesina et al., 2019b). Overall, the above baseline 





28 Another complementary explanation is that an additional demand for funding by the government at given 
available supply of savings drives up the interest rate. This effect seems less relevant in view of the large 
international capital market in which governments sell their debt. Since it is not the focus of this paper, we will 
not investigate further the relative importance of the sources of the rise in the long-term interest rate. 
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5.5. Disentangling the sources of the differences in GDP responses 
Exploiting our data on the announcements of consolidation plans, this subsection aims at 
disentangling  the sources of the differences in the GDP responses to the two types of announcements, 
focusing in particular on differences in multipliers and differences in follow-up. 
The roles of differences in multipliers and differences in follow-up 
Define the cumulative multiplier of revenues and spending associated with a one-percent of GDP 
revenue-based, respectively spending-based consolidation announcement by: 
𝑚 , ≡ ∑ 𝑦 , /∑ 𝜏 , , 𝑚 , ≡ ∑ 𝑦 , / −∑ 𝑔 , , 
where ℎ is the horizon (in quarters), 𝑦 ,  is the percent deviation of real output from its original value 
in the case of a revenue-based announcement and 𝑦 ,  similarly in the case of a spending-based 
announcement, ∑ 𝜏 ,  is the cumulative change in revenues over GDP for a revenues-based  
announcement, and −∑ 𝑔 ,  is the negative of the cumulative change in spending over GDP for a 
spending-based announcement. In the case of the latter we take the negative in order to facilitate a 
direct comparison between the two cumulative multipliers. The cumulative revenues multiplier 𝑚 ,  
is the cumulative percent change of output, divided by the cumulative increase in revenues in percent 
of GDP over a horizon of ℎ periods. The interpretation of 𝑚 ,  is analogous. 
To explore the relative roles of differences in multipliers and differences in follow-up for the output 
dynamics, we can rewrite the above expressions as: 
  ∑ 𝑦 , = 𝑚 , ∑𝑗=1




Hence, the cumulative change in output following an announcement shock, i.e. the left-hand side of 
each expression, is the product of the cumulative multiplier, given by the first factor on the right-hand 
side, and degree of follow-up to the announcement, i.e. the second factor on the right-hand side. 
Throughout we will assume that the multiplier per unit of change of the policy instrument is 
independent of the size of the change. Moreover, our model is estimated using non-cyclically adjusted 
values for our budgetary variables. Because our sample covers all business cycle situations, we 
effectively calculate the average cumulative multipliers over the business cycle. 
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the figures for the cumulative multipliers 𝑚 ,  and 𝑚 , . As variables 
are forced to return to their baseline, we limit ourselves to a maximum horizon of 20 quarters. The 
cumulative revenue multiplier under revenue-based announcements is negative at all horizons and 
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becoming more negative with the horizon. The effect on output per percentage-point of GDP increase 
in revenues is substantial and reaches minus 3.5 percent after 5 years. The cumulative spending 
multiplier under spending-based announcements is always close to zero. Row 3 of Table 5 reports the 
difference in the two cumulative multipliers, calculated as ∑ 𝑦 , /∑ 𝜏 , − ∑ 𝑦 , /
−∑ 𝑔 , . Note that, because they normalize the cumulative output change in the instruments’ 
use, the multipliers can be directly compared. We observe that the confidence interval on the 
difference lies below zero at any horizon. 
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 5 also report the follow-up in terms of the “own” instrument, i.e. ∑ 𝜏 ,  for 
revenue-based and −∑ 𝑔 ,  for spending-based announcements, while row 3 reports the difference 
in follow-up. We observe that, in addition to the cumulative multiplier being larger for revenue-based 
than for spending-based announcements, also the degree of follow-up in the respective instruments 
is larger under the former. Over the first two years the confidence band is entirely above zero, 
suggesting that the differences in the responses of output following the two types of consolidation 
announcements are driven by both differences in multipliers and differences in follow-up working into 
the same direction. 
While the literature has mostly looked at the output multipliers in response to either revenues or 
spending, consolidation packages generally deploy increases in both revenues and spending. 29 Hence, 
to further improve the comparison of the multipliers, we define the cumulative primary-balance 
multiplier of output following a one-percent of GDP announcement shock 𝐹 as: 
𝑚 , , ≡ ∑ 𝑦 , /∑ 𝑝𝑏 , ,  
where, for announcement type 𝐹, 𝑦 ,  is the percent deviation of real output from its original value 
and 𝑝𝑏 ,  the impulse response of the primary balance in percentage points of GDP. Here, 𝐹 = 𝑟 in 
the case of a revenue-based announcement and 𝐹 = 𝑠 in the case of a spending-based 
announcement. The cumulative primary-balance multiplier 𝑚 , ,  of output for announcement type 
 
29 Figure F.9 in Appendix F reports the results of an experiment in which we calculate cumulative primary-balance 
multipliers of output for revenue-based (spending-based) announcements, while holding the actual spending 
(revenues) response fixed at zero for the first K=8 quarters. This is achieved, as in Mountford and Uhlig (2009), 
by feeding the system with additional shocks, calculated via a non-linear equation solver, to ensure that the 
response of the relevant variable, actual spending in the case of a revenue-based announcement, to the 
consolidation announcement is zero. This experiment should not be subject to the “Lucas critique”, because the 
VAR parameters are not modified. The idea of the experiment is to show the “pure” cumulative multipliers by 
purging the response of spending (revenues) under the revenue-based (spending-based) plan announcements. The 
resulting multipliers are very similar to those reported in Table 5. 
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𝐹 is the cumulative percent change of output, divided by the cumulative improvement in the primary 
balance in percent of GDP over a horizon of ℎ periods.  
Rows 4 and 5 of Table 5 show that the cumulative multipliers 𝑚 , ,  and 𝑚 , ,  are similar to 𝑚 ,  
and 𝑚 , , respectively, which reflects the dominance of revenue measures in revenue-based plans 
and spending measures in spending-based plans. This is also the case for the difference  
𝑚 , , − 𝑚 , , , reported in row 6, of which the confidence band uniformly lies below zero at any 
reported horizon. Rows 4 – 6 report the degree of follow-up of the primary balance to the 
announcement types, as well as the difference in follow-up. Again, follow-up is larger for revenue-
based announcements. However, the confidence band is only fully above zero after one year. 
Overall, the results reported in Table 5 suggest that the differences in the responses of output 
following the two types of consolidation announcements are driven by both differences in multipliers 
and differences in follow-up working into the same direction. 
 
Table 5: Cumulative fiscal consolidation multipliers at various horizons 
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Notes: (i) The announcement shock always has a magnitude of 1 percent of GDP. (ii) Horizon ℎ is expressed in 
quarters. (iii) The figure reported in the first line of the cell is the median of the draws from the posterior 
distribution, while the interval in parentheses in the second line is the 68% error band around the median. (iv) 
Note that the median of the difference in cumulative multipliers is generally not equal to the difference in the 































Further exploration of multipliers and follow-up: counterfactual 
To further explore the roles of differences in multipliers and differences in follow-up for the GDP 
responses under the two type of announcements, we turn to a counterfactual experiment. The idea 
behind the counterfactual is that we impose the same follow-up under the two types of 
announcements, so that the difference in output effects can be attributed to differences in fiscal 
multipliers only. Specifically, in the experiment we lift the degree of follow-up under a spending-based 
announcement to the actual follow-up under a revenues-based announcement, and vice versa. 
We proceed as follows. We can calculate the cumulative output effect in percent (indicated by a tilde) 
under announcement 𝐹(= 𝑟, 𝑠) for some common counterfactual primary-balance path (indicated by 
subscript c) as: 
∑ 𝑦 , = 𝑚 , , ∑ 𝑝𝑏 ,   
where 𝑚 , ,  is the multiplier calculated above. Lagging this expression by one period, subtracting it 
from the original one, and rewriting, yields the counterfactual value of output growth after ℎ quarters: 
𝑦 , = 𝑚 , , ∑ 𝑝𝑏 , − 𝑚 , , ∑ 𝑝𝑏 , . 
 
Hence, 𝑦 ,  and 𝑦 ,   represent the responses of output to revenue- and spending-based consolidation 
announcements imposing a common counterfactual follow-up trajectory for the primary balance. 
We can now construct 𝑦 , − 𝑦 , − 𝑦 , − 𝑦 , , i.e. the difference in GDP responses under 
revenue- and spending-based announcements based on the estimated actual follow-up in both cases, 
minus the difference in GDP responses under some common counterfactual follow-up scenario. 
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We consider two specific common counterfactual scenarios: in the first, we impose that the 
counterfactual primary balance follow-up is identical to the actual follow-up under the revenue-based 
announcement. Hence,  𝑦 , = 𝑦 , , so 𝑦 , − 𝑦 , − 𝑦 , − 𝑦 ,  reduces to − 𝑦 , − 𝑦 , . This 
quantity captures for spending-based announcements the difference in output responses resulting 
from different follow-ups. As shown in the top panel of Figure 5, the confidence band around this 
difference always contains zero except in the first quarter after the announcement. The size of the 
difference is always less than 0.1% of original GDP. By contrast, if we impose that the counterfactual 
primary balance follow-up is identical to the actual follow-up after the spending-based 
announcement, the aforementioned difference reduces to 𝑦 , − 𝑦 , , which is the difference in 
output responses from different follow-up under revenue-based announcements. This difference is 
negative, as expected, because the counterfactual follow-up is smaller than the actual follow-up. As 
of almost four years after the announcement the confidence band falls entirely below zero (see 
bottom panel in Figure 5) and, in terms of magnitude, the difference is larger than that depicted in the 
top panel, reaching a maximum of approximately 0.5% of original GDP. Hence, if the follow-up under 
revenue-based announcements were to drop to the actual level under spending-based 
announcements, then the drop in GDP would be substantially smaller than that under the actual 
follow-up under revenue-based announcements. 
Figure 5 provides further support for the hypothesis that the differences in the GDP responses 
following the two announcement types are the result of a combination of a larger multiplier following 
a revenue-based announcement and larger follow-up after such a type of announcement: an increase 
in the latter from the actual level after a spending-based announcement to that after a revenue-based 
announcement produces an additional contraction in output that becomes significantly different from 
zero after some time. The cumulative multiplier of the revenue-based consolidation is increasing with 
the horizon (in absolute size). This explains why the drop below zero of the confidence band in the 
second panel of Figure 5 lags the negative peak in the GDP difference in Figure 2, which is the result 
of both a difference in cumulative multipliers and an earlier peaking difference in follow-up. 
6. Extension to the open economy 
Because the EU economies in our sample are open, an important question is whether this openness 
matters for the (different) effects of (different) consolidation announcements. To investigate this, we 
expand the baseline model with both quantity and price variables relating to the open economy. In 
particular, we add to the baseline exports, imports and the real effective exchange rate. The response 
of the latter to fiscal shocks has puzzled the literature, with different contributions finding different 
responses following a fiscal expansion. Given the nature of our dataset, our analysis is particularly 
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well-suited to account for the role of the real effective exchange rate following fiscal consolidation 
news, on which there exists little empirical evidence in the literature. The reason is that our model 
allows the nominal effective exchange rate, the main driver of the real effective exchange rate in the 
presence of price stickiness, to jump upon fiscal consolidation news. Our Bayesian estimation 
approach is, moreover, well-suited to handle the resulting, larger panel VAR. 
The extended model features the following vector of endogenous variables: 
𝑍 ,  = [𝐹 , , 𝜏 , , 𝑔 , , 𝑦 , , 𝑐 , , 𝐿𝑇𝐼 , , 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹 , , 𝑒𝑥𝑝 , , 𝑖𝑚𝑝 , , 𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 , ]′,   (5) 
where 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ,  and 𝑖𝑚𝑝 ,  are nominal exports and imports, respectively, in percent of nominal GDP and 
 𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 ,  is the logarithm (times 100) of the real effective exchange rate. An increase (decrease) in the 
latter means an appreciation (depreciation). 
6.1. Results for the baseline extended to the open economy 
Figure 6 depicts the impulse responses for the above baseline model extended with open-economy 
variables. The responses of the baseline variables are very similar to those depicted in Figure 2. For 
both types of announcement exports rise (by roughly the same amount). Imports exhibit a substantial 
fall under a revenue-based announcement, while they are essentially unchanged following a spending-
based announcement, a combination of patterns consistent (in a basic textbook setting) with the 
finding that a revenue-based announcement leads to a stronger negative GDP effect. In both cases, 
the real effective exchange rate depreciates. The peak depreciation is roughly twice as large for the 
spending-based announcement. 
The response patterns of the open-economy variables are consistent with standard mechanisms. A 
reduction in government spending, typically concentrated on domestic products, reduces the demand 
for domestic non-tradables and tradables. Relative to (imperfectly substitutable) competing products, 
we expect the price of tradables to fall, both because of a direct reduction in the demand from the 
government and because the reduced demand for non-tradables, typically services with substantial 
labor input, will contain economy-wide labor costs. Since prices are sticky, short-run adjustment takes 
place through a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate, as predicted, for example, by the 
New-Keynesian open-economy model of Corsetti et al. (2011) and in line with Bénétrix and Lane’s 
(2013) estimates for eurozone countries. The fall in the real effective exchange rate is driven by a fall 
in the nominal effective exchange rate, as shown by Figures F.5 and F.6 in Appendix F, which replace 
the real effective exchange rate with the nominal effective exchange rate, respectively the nominal 
exchange rate of the local currency against the U.S. dollar (and which exhibit responses for the other 
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variables very similar to those in Figure 6). The response patterns in Figure 6 are also consistent with 
standard settings in which the fall in (disposable) income caused by higher taxes lowers the demand 
for imports. Short-run adjustment is again achieved by a depreciation of the real effective exchange 
rate driven by a fall in nominal exchange rates. 
6.2. Fixed versus floating exchange rate regimes 
As discussed in Section 2, part of the literature offers rather sharply differing predictions on the effects 
of fiscal expansions (or contractions) under floating versus fixed exchange rate regimes. None or 
virtually none of the regimes in our sample can be characterized as perfect floats or pegs. For example, 
since 1999 most of the countries in our sample are part of the eurozone, which implies a common 
currency among its members, while the exchange rate against most of the rest of the world remains 
flexible. The same applies to the countries that were member of the European Monetary System 
before 1999. They tried to peg against the German mark, although many of them had to occasionally 
devaluate their currency. 
Nevertheless, in this subsection we try to separate observations based on the exchange rate regime. 
Using the classification in Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) as well as internet sources, we classify pegs, 
currency unions and exchange rate bands as “fixed” and the remaining regimes as “floats”. Hence, 
floats also include crawling pegs, crawling bands, moving bands, etcetera. The division in fixed and 
floating regimes is reported in Appendix E. The fixed sample contains 985 observations, while the 
floating sample features 607 observations. 
Figure 7 depicts the responses of the model based on (5). There are some differences for the two 
exchange rate regimes. First, consider revenue-based announcements. Follow-up in terms of revenues 
is quite similar for the two regimes. This is also the case for GDP. The fall in consumption is slightly 
larger under a float. However, the main differences are with respect to the long-term interest rate and 
the open-economy variables. The long-term interest rate only increases under a float. In line with the 
standard Mundell-Fleming model, this is also the case for exports, while imports fall under a fixed 
exchange rate. Contrary to this standard model, imports are unaffected under a float. The real 
effective exchange rate is unaffected under a fixed exchange rate, while it depreciates strongly under 
a float. Turning to expenditure-based announcements, the reduction in spending is overall slightly 
larger under a float than under a fixed exchange rate regime. Also, revenues increase under a float, 
but do not under a fixed regime. These differences may help to explain why we observe that GDP, 
consumption and consumer confidence are all flat under a fixed rate, but fall under a float. Somewhat 
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surprisingly, and in contrast to the textbook prediction, imports rise under a float, even though GDP 
falls. 
While the basic textbook and part of the more advanced literature predict that a fiscal contraction 
produces a drop in GDP under a fixed exchange rate and no GDP change under a float, the GDP 
responses in Figure 7 deviate from this prediction. The most plausible explanation is that the textbook 
monetary accommodation under the fixed regime is essentially absent for our sample countries as 
they are part of a large fixed regime block, in which an individual country’s fiscal actions elicit very 
little response by the central bank in control of monetary policy. An additional factor potentially 
contributing to the deviation from the textbook predictions is that the distinction between the 
exchange rate regimes is not as clear-cut in practice, because our sample countries also trade directly 
with countries outside the fixed regime block. 
6.3. Multipliers and follow-up in the open economy 
This subsection explores whether the extension of the baseline model with open-economy variables 
affects the multipliers we calculated earlier. For reasons of space and because the differences in GDP 
responses between revenue- and spending-based consolidation announcements for the two exchange 
rate regimes are rather similar (see Figure 7), we do not consider these regimes separately. Table 6 is 
structured in a similar way as Table 5, and reports the cumulative multipliers following the 
announcements. The cumulative multipliers are close to those associated with the baseline 
specification. Only at long horizons, 5 years out, do cumulative multipliers start to diverge from their 
values for the closed-economy specification. However, confidence intervals so far out become so 
wide, that a comparison is no longer very meaningful. The confidence band on the difference between 
the cumulative multipliers for both announcement types remains firmly below zero at all horizons. 
The primary-balance multipliers are again larger in absolute value for revenue-based announcements 
and the confidence interval on the difference lies entirely below zero for a horizon up to three years. 
The cumulative primary balance following revenue-based announcements exceeds that after 
spending-based announcements, and the confidence band on the difference lies above zero over the 
first three years. Quantitatively, the responses are similar to those for the closed-economy 
specification; only at the 5-year horizon does the difference in primary-balance multiplier become 
quite a bit smaller than for the closed-economy specification. 
Table 6 also reports the cumulative fiscal multipliers for the trade balance, defined as 𝑚 , , ≡
∑ 𝑇𝐵 , /∑ 𝑝𝑏 ,  for 𝐹 = 𝑟, 𝑠, where the changes in the trade balance 𝑇𝐵 ,  are calculated as the 
difference between the impulse responses of exports and imports, all in percentage points of GDP. 
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We report the cumulative multipliers of this specific component of GDP to explore whether the 
difference in economic performance following a revenue- versus a spending-based announcement can 
be attributed to the open-economy character of countries in our sample. A revenue-based 
announcement is followed by a substantial positive effect on the cumulative trade balance multiplier, 
especially via a reduction in imports. The cumulative trade-balance multiplier following a spending-
based announcement is also positive, though this is primarily driven by an improvement of exports. 
The confidence band on the difference in the cumulative multipliers 𝑚 , , − 𝑚 , ,  contains zero 
except at a horizon of 5 years, suggesting that differences in trade balance responses are not 
responsible for the difference in responses following the two types of announcements, all the more 
so since the trade balance improves more following a revenue-based announcement. 
Figure F.7 in Appendix F shows the results of a counterfactual experiment for the extended model 
computed in exactly the same way as in Figure 5. Raising follow-up after a spending-based 
announcement does have a negative effect on output. However, the confidence band around the 
depicted difference includes zero. The output effect of the same change in follow-up after a revenue-
based announcement is up to around three times larger and the confidence band lies fully below zero 
for much of the horizon. 
The results in this subsection indicate again that the difference in the GDP responses following the 
two announcement types is the result of a combination of a larger multiplier following revenue-based 
announcements and larger follow-up following this type of announcement. 
 
Table 6: Cumulative fiscal consolidation and trade balance multipliers at various horizons 
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Notes: (i) The announcement shock always has a magnitude of 1 percent of GDP. (ii) Horizon ℎ is expressed in 
quarters. (iii) The figure reported in the first line of the cell is the median of the draws from the posterior 
distribution, while the interval in parentheses in the second line is the 68% error band around the median. (iv) 
Note that the median of the difference in cumulative multipliers is generally not equal to the difference in the 
medians of the multipliers; similarly for the other quantities. (v) “TB” is “trade balance”. (vi) The multipliers are 
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7. Conclusions 
Existing literature shows that narratively-identified spending-based consolidations have milder effects 
on the economy than revenue-based consolidations. In line with this, and using a quarterly narrative 
dataset on fiscal consolidation announcements, this paper finds that announcements of revenue-
based plans have more adverse effects on economic activity than announcements of spending-based 
plans. We use a panel VAR analysis to show that the combination of larger revenue multipliers and, to 
a lesser extent, larger actual follow-up after a revenue-based announcement helps to explain these 
differences. The main results are the same for our closed-economy and open-economy specifications. 
The responses  for the specific open-economy variables are in line with standard mechanisms. The 
unique nature of the dataset allows us to take proper account of fiscal anticipation effects and to 
control for relevant asset prices and other variables that respond quickly to news, such as the interest 
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rate, confidence indicators, stock prices and the exchange rate. It is important to notice, though, that 
the stronger negative output effect for a given follow-up of a revenue-based consolidation does not 
automatically imply that a spending-based consolidation is preferable; if the public budget is on an 
unsustainable path, announcing a revenue-based consolidation with a higher expected degree of 
implementation may be preferable.  
Our analysis suggests a number of avenues for further research. First, it would be interesting to 
explore the extent to which the shortfalls from announcements of revenue- or spending-based 
consolidations originate from a lack of full implementation or errors in the projected impact on GDP. 
Second, it may be possible that the effects of consolidation announcements depend on the state of 
the economy or the public finances and, hence, it would be worthwhile to investigate their role. 
Finally, the composition of spending and revenues packages may matter. For example, the resistance 
to rolling back certain transfers may be larger than to increasing VAT, making announcements of the 
latter more credible than of the former. However, the latter two avenues for further research would 
require an expansion of the current dataset in order to draw reliable conclusions. 
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Figure 1: Impulse responses baseline model – all consolidation plan announcements 
 
Notes: (i) The consolidation announcement shock (not portrayed) always has a magnitude of 1 percent of GDP. (ii) The figure depicts median impulse responses and their 68% 
error band. (iii) The impulse responses for revenues and spending are deviations in percentage points of GDP from their original values; GDP, consumption and consumer 




Figure 2: Impulse responses baseline model – revenue- and spending-based plan announcements  
 
Notes: See Notes to Figure 1. Further, the first column depicts the impulse responses to revenue-based plan announcements, while the second column exhibits the 





Figure 3: Robustness analysis: differences revenue- and spending-based announcements
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Figure 3: Robustness analysis: differences revenue- and spending-based announcements  (continued) 
 
 
Notes: See Notes to Figure 1 and description in the main text. The figure shows differences between revenue- and spending-based announcements for actual revenue, actual 





Figure 4: Impulse responses baseline model extended with the debt-to-GDP ratio 
Notes: see Notes to Figure 2. 
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Figure 5: Differences in responses between actual and counterfactual
 
Notes: See Notes to Figure 1 and description in the main text. The vertical axis refers to percent deviations from original GDP. The top panel depicts the GDP response to a 
spending-based announcement based on the actual primary-balance response minus the GDP response based on a counterfactual primary-balance response equal to the actual 
primary-balance response for a revenue-based announcement. The bottom panel depicts the GDP response to a revenue-based announcement based the actual primary balance 




Figure 6: Impulse responses open-economy specification 
 




Figure 7: Impulse responses open-economy specification: fixed versus floating 
 
Notes: see Notes to Figure 2.  
